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How Socio-Legal Norms Emerge within Complex
Networks: Law and (In)Formality at Ipanema Beach
Pedro R. Fortes*
ABSTRACT
This article explores the interplay of formal and informal normative
arrangements and provides an ethnographical analysis of socio-legal norms
at Ipanema Beach in Brazil. For Brazilian society, beaches are so important
that even constitutional norms regulate their operation and guarantee free
access for everyone. Likewise, Brazilians usually refer to beaches as
‘democratic spaces’ and this paper discusses the exotic association between
a geographical area and governmental structure. Is equal participation and
symmetrical power for all beachgoers in Brazil realistic, or is this notion of
a democratic beach just a myth?
This article also focuses on the existence of an informal food market at
Ipanema Beach and analyzes its regulation, informal arrangements of
antitrust (anticompetitive market prices), as well as issues of environmental
and consumer protection. In addition, this study assesses informal land
regimes and discusses which norms are available to regulate the occupation
of the space by beachgoers. In this context, tent managers and informal
parking-space-finders provide informal arrangements that guarantee
parking, tents, and chairs for beachgoers. The State is also present at
Ipanema Beach by way of municipal guards, police officers, and lifeguards,
who are expected to enforce the laws and maintain order.
However, there are many examples of resistance to legal regulations
and to criminal law enforcement. For instance, marijuana smokers tend to
*
Professor of Law at Fundação Getúlio Vargas Direito Rio (Getúlio Vargas Foundation Law,
Rio de Janeiro), LL.B., Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro);
B.A. in Business, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (Pontifical Catholic University of
Rio de Janeiro); LL.M., Harvard Law School; J.S.M., Stanford Law School; D. Phil. c., Centre for
Socio-Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, Oxford. I would like to thank Manuel Gomez and Marc Galanter
for the invitation to participate in the symposium “Layers of Law and Social Order” at Florida
International University College of Law, and for Franco Bacigalupo, Audrey Salbo, Alix Boren, Grettel
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frequent a particular area of the Beach and they make noise to alert others
of police officers in an effort to prevent arrests. Further, frescobol (a local
game played with rackets) players are not fined for playing the game at
certain times, but at non-designated times their sanctions consist of
warnings, threats to report them to authorities, and eventually the
confiscation of the ball. Dogs are also prohibited, but are tolerated in an
isolated corner of the Beach. In summary, a range of (in)formal normative
arrangements characterize law and society at Ipanema Beach.
I. A METHODOLOGICAL EXCURSUS: THE CONFESSIONAL APPROACH,
RETROSPECTIVE PARTICIPATORY OBSERVATION, AND ANALYTICAL
NARRATIVES IN SOCIO-LEGAL RESEARCH
Before starting my analyses, I would like to state that three
methodological aspects of my research should not be ignored and highlight
them for discussion with all participants of this symposium. First, this is a
confessional paper in the sense that it contains autobiographical
information. Immediately after birth, I was taken to my parents’ apartment
fifty meters away from Ipanema Beach and have lived most of my life
there. In contrast to my parents, who were teenagers when they moved to
Rio de Janeiro, Ipanema was always a part of my life and going to the beach
there was a regular form of leisure. Therefore, I am not only analyzing
socio-legal norms in a limited spatial area, but also revisiting a very
important part of my own existence when I discuss law and (in)formality at
Ipanema Beach. Unlike Ellickson in Shasta County,1 Goffman in Bali,2 and
Sousa Santos in Pasargada,3 I am dealing with a very particular universe
that I experienced predominantly as a participant rather than an observer.
Resultantly, I borrow from Joaquim Falcão this sense that an
autobiographical project—like my work here—is confessional.4
Second, I would consider my work to be an ethnographic study, as I
am providing a thick description of legal culture within Ipanema Beach.5
However, this study has one very important distinction from traditional
social anthropology. According to traditional anthropological research,
researchers define their main investigation, questions, and research agenda
prior to their field trip and to their immersion within the investigated

1 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors
in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).
2 See generally Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books 1977).
3 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction
of Legality in Pasargada, 12 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5 (1977).
4 JOAQUIM FALCÃO, ET AL., TEORIA DO DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL (6th ed., FGV Direito Rio
Editora, 2008).
5 Geertz, supra note 2.
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community. In my case, the research question was offered to me by
accident a couple of years ago. As a Stanford Program in International
Legal Studies (“SPILS”) student in 2007, I was chatting with my professor,
Lawrence Friedman, during the break in one of our Law and Society
classes. Professor Friedman was contemplating a visit to Brazil and
mentioned that one of his friends once went to a beach in Rio.
After enjoying a nice swim, he found out that all his belongings had
been stolen. After hearing this story, I explained to Professor Friedman that
locals know about these dangers, and always ask someone to look after our
belongings when they go swimming. Professor Friedman commented that
this informal social arrangement could be a point of departure for a study of
law and society on Brazilian beaches. His insight into how many
interesting and informal social norms could probably be found in such a
context made me retrospectively consider my three decades of experience
as a beachgoer. It also encouraged me to assess this interplay of formal
legal rules and informal social norms at Ipanema Beach. Unlike Nader in
Mexico,6 Levi-Strauss in Brazil,7 and Pirie in Tibet,8 I was not capable of
pursuing prospective research, but rather retrospective observation as a
participant beachgoer in the investigated universe.
Therefore, one of the interesting questions for discussion is whether
retrospective participatory observation is a valid methodological tool for
socio-legal research. In my opinion, it could be considered a valid tool, as
long as it is used it for exploratory socio-legal research, and its limitations
regarding the generalization of research findings are acknowledged.
Admitting to the validity of retrospective participatory observation may
enrich the methodological toolbox of socio-legal research. It would also
create opportunities for researchers to provide more detailed, textured, and
nuanced analyses of universes they have experienced as active participants
prior to conducting their research. In any event, socio-legal research is
always dependent on inter-subjective approval of a community of sociolegal scholars, and findings are always evaluated and judged by rigorous
peer-review, which negotiates some of the issues associated with subjective
research. Likewise, retrospective participatory observation should only be
limited to research projects in which the memory of the researcher and the
reconstruction of past experiences are more adequate for the analysis than

6
See generally LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC
MOUNTAIN VILLAGE (Stanford Univ. Press 1990).
7
See generally CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, TRISTES TROPIQUES (John Weightman & Doreen
Weightman trans., Penguin rev. ed. 1992).
8
See generally FERNANDA PIRIE, PEACE AND CONFLICT IN LADAKH: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
FRAGILE WEB OF ORDER (Brill Academic Publishers 2007).

186

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 10:183

other methodological tools and strategies.9
Third, and in addition to the confessional approach and retrospective
participatory observation, this paper also benefits from using the analytical
narrative technique, which combines the descriptive element of historical
narratives with the analytical element of rational choice theory and game
theory.10 Consequently, the paper is not limited to a thick description of
law and society at Ipanema Beach, but also analyzes a set of incentives and
disincentives that relevant legal actors have for their conduct within this
socio-legal universe. As a research technique, analytical narratives have
been widely used in international relations and history, and could also be
explored for socio-legal studies. As this combination of a confessional
approach, retrospective participatory observation, and analytical narratives
seems unusual, I have provided the reader with this methodological
excursus for our discussion.
II. IPANEMA BEACH AS A SOCIO-LEGAL SPACE: SOCIAL TRIBES, NETWORK
MEMBERSHIP, AND CULTURAL DISTINCTIONS
Ipanema Beach is just one of forty-six beaches found in Rio de
Janeiro, but is known worldwide because of the famous bossa nova song
“The Girl from Ipanema.” Ipanema comprises a strip of white sands, 2.6
kilometers long, between a 130-meter canal named the “Garden of Allah”
(separating Ipanema from Leblon), and a rocky formation known as “the
harpooner’s rock” (separating Ipanema from Copacabana).
In the
indigenous language of Tupy, Ypanema means “useless water” and this may
be a reference to the existence of a large lagoon one kilometer from
Ipanema Beach that historically had no fish due to its pestilent waters. In
1894, the neighborhood of Ipanema was founded on this small patch of land
between the lagoon and the Beach. Ipanema was far away from downtown
Rio and was instead an isolated part of Rio de Janeiro with just a few
houses. Since the 1970s, Ipanema has become one of the most desirable
areas to live in Rio de Janeiro, and there are currently around 40,000
residents in this small neighborhood. In addition to some of the most
expensive apartments in town, Ipanema also contains a favela, which is
located on top of the mountain Cantagalo and contains 1,500 houses with
approximately 4,700 residents. Within this microcosm inside Ipanema,
formal “asphalt law” competes with the informal law of Pasargada,
excellently explained in Sousa Santos’s seminal socio-legal article.11

9
At the Conference on Law and (in)formality at Stanford Law School, I received from Ather Zia
feedback indicating that this practice is accepted by anthropologists, and is labeled auto-anthropology.
10
ROBERT BATES, ET AL., ANALYTICAL NARRATIVES, (Princeton Univ. Press 1998).
11
See Sousa Santos, supra note 3, at 6-124.
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Ipanema Beach is an intriguing socio-legal space for a number of
reasons. The neighborhood has been depicted in many films and soap
operas and it has become an iconic beach in the imagination of Brazilians.
Therefore, the Beach regularly receives many more foreign visitors than its
own resident population. Tens of thousands of beachgoers are distributed
across different parts of the Beach, each of whom belong to one of the
many social tribes. Close to lifeguard tower Number Ten, beachgoers can
predominantly be characterized as “yuppies,” young urban professionals in
their twenties and thirties. In this area, there is a concentration of lawyers,
economists, engineers, and business people, who gather together in front of
different tents. Given that this part of the beach is popular among yuppies,
it is full of people on weekends, but quite empty on weekdays.
Close to lifeguard tower Number Nine, beachgoers can be
characterized as “hippies,” alternative, young, free-spirited individuals in
their twenties and thirties. In this area, there is a concentration of artists,
journalists, and jobless people, who also have their own favorite tents. As
many of these people have flexible schedules, are jobless, or free-lance
workers, this part of the Beach is almost always full. Close to lifeguard
tower Number Eight, beachgoers can be characterized as LGBT, as this is
how they tend to self-identify. In this area, tents usually display a rainbow
flag as an invitation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transvestite customers.
As Rio has become a very popular destination for the international LGBT
community, particularly for New Year’s Eve and the notorious carnival,
this part of the beach is packed every Brazilian summer.
In addition to these three lifeguard towers,12 beachgoers also divide
themselves between 150 different tents. These different tents are licensed
by the city, and their owners have a formal permit to sell food and drinks,
and to rent out beach chairs and sun umbrellas. Local beachgoers usually
establish one of these tents as their meeting point and frequently go to the
exact same tent, where they are likely to meet their beach friends. These
tents function as reference points for social networks, and groups of
frequent beachgoers from the same social tribes aggregate here.
Relationships between beachgoers cannot be compared to a close-knit
community13 or a close ethnic network,14 but regulars get the chance to
12

During the symposium Manuel Gomez and Grettel Zubiaur asked me about the other lifeguard
towers at Ipanema Beach. Numbers One to Six are located at Copacabana Beach and Numbers 11 and
12 are located at Leblon Beach. Lifeguard Tower Number Seven is a meeting point for beachgoers from
the suburbs, because several bus stops are located very close to this part of Ipanema Beach. In a
subsequent study, I should investigate the existence of informal social norms there as well.
13
Allan Shapiro, Law in the Kibbutz: A Reappraisal, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 415, 415-38
(1976).
14
See generally Barak D. Richman, How Community Create Economic Advantage: Jewish
Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 J. LAW & SOCIAL ENQUIRY 383, 383-420 (2006).

188

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 10:183

meet each other, talk to people who go to the same tent, and to interact in a
complex way with other beachgoers.15 Their social interactions are
analogous to a club,16 where membership is not limited to those who pay an
annual fee and have membership cards. In these beach tents, individuals
enter social networks by repeatedly playing the social game of visiting the
same spot on the beach, interacting with local people, gaining a reputation,
and getting accepted as a member of a given social tribe. In other words,
there are informal processes of social interaction that result in the inclusion
or exclusion of an individual within these social networks. As these beach
tents are open to everyone, anyone may use them as their reference point,
but outsiders,17 and one-shot players,18 will not have easy access to the
social network.
As Ipanema Beach is free and open to the general public, people from
all different socio-economic strata go there. Therefore, individuals from
lower, middle, and upper classes share the same territorial space, as
everyone is entitled to choose their spot on the white sands freely. On one
hand, all Brazilian individuals have equal access to the beach and use the
same geographical area. On the other hand, individuals differentiate
themselves according to various cultural aspects that define their group
membership and social networks. In this sense, there are all sorts of
distinctions that approximate and distance individuals.19 In addition to the
membership in different social tribes of yuppies, hippies, and the LGBT
community, socio-economic background also contributes to inclusion or
exclusion within these social networks. In particular, the poor residents of
favelas may have less opportunity to be accepted as members of an upperclass group of friends and vice versa. Interestingly, these complex social
networks are primarily centered on the three lifeguard towers and 150 beach
tents, which have a symbolic impact on the different social tribes and
individual interactions. As evidenced, Ipanema Beach constitutes a
complex socio-legal space, in which people distribute themselves not only
around beach towers and tents, but also via cultural symbols of social
distinction, economic class, and tribal membership.20 Locals can easily

15

See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 623-87.
See Richman, supra note 14, at 395-98.
17 See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 623-87.
18 Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1, 95-160 (1974).
19 PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE (Routledge
2013).
20 Another fascinating example of a complex socio-legal space is found at Manuel A. Gomez’s
contribution to this symposium. Manuel A. Gómez, The Tower of David: Social Order in a Vertical
Community, 10 FIU L. Rev. 215 (2014); see also Manuel A. Gómez, Order in the Desert: Law Abiding
Behavior at Burning Man, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. (2013); Manuel A. Gómez, Dusty Order: Law
16
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identify these aspects, distinguish each other accordingly, and position
themselves within their social tribes, networks, and classes. There are a few
opportunities for social movement, but these are clearly limited.
Transcending social boundaries is not so common.
III. LEGAL RULES ON IPANEMA BEACH: FOOD MARKETS, SPORT, AND THE
PROHIBITION OF PETS
Ipanema Beach is a spatial area permeated by formal, legal rules
enacted at federal, state, and municipal levels. First, the Brazilian Federal
Constitution of 1988 defines all maritime beaches as property of the
Union.21 However, the Federal Constitution is silent on the consequences
or implications of this clause. One possible interpretation is that these areas
may not be transferred to particular individuals, as they are public by
definition. However, the Federal Constitution does not expressly prohibit
private use or private possession of property within these maritime beaches.
In addition, according to Brazilian administrative law, public property may
be temporarily disposed of, or leased to private individuals, or to
corporations.22 Likewise, some public properties require payment for their
use, to finance the associated costs. On many occasions, the state will
charge fees, tariffs, and tickets to cover intrinsic expenses for providing or
conserving a public service. For instance, access to the Theatre of Rio de
Janeiro is limited to those who purchase a ticket. Also, some ecological
parks charge visitors for environmental conservation of the visited unit,
and, on some federal roads, drivers must pay a toll to use this public good.
According to administrative law, all federal property can be temporarily
transferred or leased to private individuals or corporations;23 nothing in the
Federal Constitution prevents a ticket, fee, or toll from being charged to
users of these public goods.
Interestingly, the State Constitution of Rio de Janeiro also contains
rules regarding maritime beaches, even if these federal properties do not
belong to the State.24 The State of Rio de Janeiro included in its

Enforcement and Participant Cooperation at Burning Man, in PLAYA DUST: COLLECTED STORIES FROM
BURNING MAN (Samantha Krukowski, ed., 2014).
21
See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL DE 1988 [FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION OF BRAZIL] art. 20, IV (Braz.), DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 5.10.1988.
Article 20, section IV reads, “the Union has property of . . . the maritime beaches.”
22
Evandro Martins Guerra, Bens Públicos, 21 REVISTA DO TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS DO ESTADO
DE MINAS GERAIS, N. 3 (2003), available at http://200.198.41.151:8081/tribunal_contas/2003/03/sumario?next=2 (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
23
Id.
24
CONSTITUIÇÃO DO ESTADO DE RIO DO JANEIRO DE 1989 [STATE CONSTITUTION OF RIO DE
JANEIRO] art. 32, II; art. 268, II (Braz.).
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constitution the fundamental right of access to beaches.25 According to
Article 32 of the State Constitution of Rio de Janeiro, “the state shall
guarantee access to the beaches for all citizens, prohibiting within its
competence any private building on the sands.”26 In 2000, this fundamental
right was expanded through State Law Number 3430/00, mandating that all
municipalities should remove private building on the sands within the
following thirty days and that parking places should be demarcated to
guarantee full access to everyone.27 In addition, the State Constitution of
Rio de Janeiro granted special status to Rio’s beaches, by classifying them
as areas of permanent environmental protection.28 These areas are entitled
to special environmental protection, which means that, according to Article
261, section XV of the State Constitution of Rio de Janeiro, the State should
promote judicial and administrative measures to establish the liability of
polluters.29
In addition to these federal and state legal rules, the Rio de Janeiro
municipality also established a series of laws and decrees, with a view to
regulate the Beach.30 Analyzing the content of these local rules, there is
clear and abundant evidence as to how the protection of beaches is
important for the municipality. For example, Municipal Law Number
5459/12 established the legal perpetuation of Copacabana Beach due to its
environmental, cultural, and visual importance.31 In concrete terms, this
means that any modification to the beach’s boardwalk, kiosks, benches,
guardrails, and anything else must be approved by the executive powers
governing the Beach.

25

CONSTITUIÇÃO DO ESTADO DE RIO DO JANEIRO DE 1989 [STATE CONSTITUTION OF RIO DE
JANEIRO] art. 32, II (Braz.).
26
Id.
27
Lei No. 3430, de 28 de Junho de 2000, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de
29.6.2000 (Braz.).
28
See CONSTITUIÇÃO DO ESTADO DO RIO DE JANEIRO DE 1989 [STATE CONSTITUTION OF RIO DE
JANEIRO] art. 268, II (Braz.).
29
See id. at art. 261, XV (Braz.).
30
Lei No. 5,459, de 19 de Junho de 2012, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de
26.12.2012 (Braz.).
31
See Lei No. 2,358, de 6 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 08.09.1995 (Braz.); Lei No. 2,574, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO
DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 01.10.1997 (Braz.); Lei No. 2,575, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.04.1998 (Braz.); Decreto No. 20,225/01, de 13 de Julho
de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.07.2001, (Braz.); Decreto No. 27,955,
de 21 de Maio de 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 22.05.2007 (Braz.);
Decreto No. 35,179, de 2 de Março de 2012, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de
05.03.2012 (Braz.); Decreto No. 37,231, de 5 de Junho de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 6.6.2013 (Braz.); Decreto No. 37,486, de 5 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO
DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 6.8.2013 (Braz.); Decreto No. 38,295, de 11 de Fevereiro de 2014, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 13.02.2014 (Braz.).
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In addition to this law, following UNESCO’s recognition of Rio’s
landscape as a world cultural heritage site, Rio’s Mayor edited two decrees
that make this combination of mountains and beaches an area of
environmental protection and (also) a park.32 At least according to the lawin-the-books, this should mean that these parts of the city are granted
special protection and should be restored to their natural states. In practice,
some of the areas that make up Rio’s unique landscape are mountains
containing favelas with tens of thousands of people; politicians will tend not
to remove these illegal houses for the sake of beautifying the landscape. On
the other hand, it would be a mistake to imagine that these decrees only
have some kind of mythological meaning. They are intended to convey the
message that this landscape should be protected and that the mayor will not
tolerate new invasions, illegal occupation, or the growth of the existing
favelas. Time will tell if the current mayor will actually pursue this agenda
or not.
Local legislation also regulates the activity of beach vendors, kiosk
owners, sport players, pet owners, and mass event organizers.33 The former
mayor edited a comprehensive decree that consolidated the existing
municipal regulations regarding the Beach and its surroundings.34
According to Decree Number 20,225/01, beach vendors must be annually
authorized by the municipality to pursue their economic activities. Some
vendors are ambulant and walk across the entire beach, while others have
the authorization to set up tents in specific spots. Only a very limited range
of products can be commercialized by beach vendors: beer cans; soft drinks
and water; coconut water; caipirinhas; fruit juices; mass-produced
sandwiches; biscuits; mass-produced potato chips; and mass-produced
popsicles.35 Ambulant vendors are also authorized to sell caps, sunscreen,
and general accessories.36 Local legislation strictly prohibits homemade
food as well as the preparation of food on the beach, particularly with
respect to grilled barbecue, grilled cheese, and pastries.37 Regarding the use
of tents, owners must wear a standard uniform, keep only three containers
for their products (which reduces their capacity to provide cold drinks for
all beachgoers on summer days), display a menu list with all prices, remove
the entire structure of their tents from the sands daily, and collect all
32
See Decreto No. 37,231, de 5 de Junho de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 6.6.2013 (Braz.); Decreto No. 37,486, de 5 de Agosto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO
DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 6.8.2013 (Braz.).
33
Decreto No. 20,225/01, de 13 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.07.2001, (Braz.).
34
Id.
35
Id. at art. 6 (Braz.).
36
Id. at art. 6, X (Braz.).
37
Id. at art. 6, § 2 (Braz.).
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garbage within a distance of twenty-five meters of their stall.38
In addition to selling products, they are also entitled to rent up to ten
sun umbrellas and twenty beach chairs to beachgoers.39 They may also
install a small shower for free use by beachgoers. In addition to ambulant
and fixed beach vendors, this decree also regulated the activity of
boardwalk kiosks, which may sell hotdogs, corn, pizzas, pastries, candies,
fruit, coffee, milk, and chocolate.40 Their capacity is limited to a maximum
of six tables with four chairs. This municipal legislation regulates the food
market on Rio’s beaches by establishing a legal framework for economic
activity and the grounds for municipal inspection and control. Beach
vendors and kiosk owners may be sanctioned with fines ranging from
seventy-five to one-hundred-and-fifty U.S. Dollars and, in cases with repeat
offenders, loss of their permits.
The same decree also authorizes the establishment of sports academies
on the beach for practice of volleyball, football, footvolley, and gymnastics,
in which a specific part of the beach is designated for the practice of these
sports.41 According to this decree, the practice of frescobol close to the sea
during summer was prohibited between eight o’clock in the morning and
four o’clock in the afternoon.42 Frescobol is a sport in which two or three
players exchange a rubber ball with special wooden rackets and their goal is
to keep playing without letting the ball fall on the ground. Players are,
therefore, not competing against each other, but rather cooperating with
each other. Created in Rio de Janeiro in 1945, frescobol became a very
popular sport. However, as beachgoers were constantly hit by rubber balls
on their way to the sea during crowded summer months, the municipality
restricted its practice to early mornings, late afternoons, or close to the
boardwalk. A more recent decree altered these prohibitive rules to the
restriction of frescobol between eight o’clock in the morning and two in the
afternoon from November until April.43 Finally, another important legal
restriction is related to pets. Since 1995 it has been compulsory for all dogs
on the boardwalk to be identifiable and chained up.44 No pets are allowed

38

Id. at art. 7 (Braz.).
Id. at art. 7, § 4 (Braz.).
40
Id. at art. 18 (Braz.).
41
Id. at art. 32 (Braz.).
42
Id. at art. 23 (Braz.).
43
Decreto No. 27,955, de 21 de Maio de 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.]
de 22.05.2007 (Braz.).
44 Lei No. 2,358, de 6 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de
08.09.1995 (Braz.); Lei No. 2,574, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 01.10.1997 (Braz.); Lei No. 2,575, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO
DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.04.1998 (Braz.).
39
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on sandy parts of the Beach.45
IV. (IN)FORMAL LEGAL ENFORCEMENT AND ITS MULTIPLE ACTORS:
NEUTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION, FRAGMENTATION,
SEGMENTATION, AND COOPERATION
Formal rules are generally considered to be only one aspect of the
complex scenario of legal regulation on Ipanema Beach. Law enforcement
also depends on informal social norms that are not expressly law in the
books, but which are developed socially through the operation of law in
action.46 Some authors suggest that informal social norms constitute their
own particular normative universe.47 For instance, Sousa Santos conceives
the law of Pasargada as a relatively autonomous set of social norms that are
generated in stark contrast to the formal legal rules enacted by the Brazilian
state.48 Likewise, Sally Moore refers to social norms that regulate the
garment industry in New York as a semi-autonomous field.49 Other authors
consider there to be a dynamic interplay between formal legal rules and
informal social norms.50 Gunther Teubner refers to the Janus face of legal
pluralism and highlights the complex dualism between legal rules and
social norms, law and society, formal and informal, rule-oriented and
spontaneous behavior.51
Likewise, Benton criticizes the structuralist separateness between
formal and informal sectors in economic discourse and the dichotomy
between lawful and unlawful activities in legal discourse.52 Introducing the
idea of rule shopping, Benton invites us to consider the complexity of legal
phenomena and how extra-legal maneuvers may sometimes be necessary to
assure the legality of certain activities.53 Benton also criticizes the multilayered vision of formality and informality, as there should be no
hierarchical relationship between formal legal rules and informal social

45

Id.
See generally STEWART MACAULAY, LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, & ELISABETH MERTZ, LAW IN
ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL READER (New York: Foundation Press 2007).
47 See Sousa Santos, supra note 3, at 5-126; see also Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change:
The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719
(1973).
48 See Sousa Santos, supra note 3, at 5-126.
49 Falk Moore, supra note 47.
50 Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV.
1443, 1443-62 (1992); Lauren A. Benton, Beyond Legal Pluralism: Towards a New Approach To Law
in the Informal Sector, 3 SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES 223–42 (1994).
51 See Teubner, supra note 50.
52 See Benton, supra note 50.
53
See generally id.
46
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norms.54 In addition to this idea of a heterarchical relationship between
state and society, her work indicates that formality and informality are
intertwined on the same plane and that non-legal social arrangements are
essential for the regulation of economic activity.55 Furthermore, she
explains, informal sectors are also strongly influenced by formal legal
rules.56
Particularly in the case of Ipanema Beach, regulation may be
considered complex due to the multiplicity of legal actors involved in
inspection, control, and law enforcement.57 As maritime beaches are
property of the union, federal authorities are entitled to deliberate over their
use, designate areas, and eventually lease them out.58 Particularly important
is the role of the Brazilian Navy, which should monitor the national coast
and manage land use of the coastal area, including maritime beaches and
islands. As the coast constitutes a large part of the country’s population
over an area of approximately 7,408 kilometers, the Brazilian Navy does
not have sufficient personnel or financial resources to exercise effective
control over this expansive coastal area. Therefore, even though the
Brazilian federal system concentrates responsibilities for coastal
management on the Federal Government, the Union welcomes cooperative
support from the state and municipal governments for management and
protection of these coastal areas. As a result, states and municipalities
exercise competences that are not strictly theirs according to the Federal
Constitution.59 This results in a complex web of federal, state, and
municipal legal rules and enforcement actions over the Brazilian coast.
There are a number of different enforcement agents at Ipanema Beach.
For instance, there are four lifeguard towers, in which state officials from
the fire brigade control areas of 800 meters, monitoring swimmers, surfers,
and beachgoers in general. Their official mandate implies rescuing people
at sea. Because they are well-respected by the population and have
permanent stations, these lifeguards are subject to certain extra-legal
demands. Likewise, military police officers patrol the white sands and the
boardwalk of Ipanema Beach; their professional mission is supposedly
limited to crime prevention and the prosecution of criminals. However, as
public officials in the area, the population requests that they solve conflicts
54

Id.
Id.
56
Id.
57
In addition to Laura Benton, the critique of multi-layered normativity is also found at Eric
Feldman’s contribution to this symposium regarding the complex regulation of electronic cigarrettes.
Eric A. Feldman, Layers of Law: The Case of E-Cigarettes, 10 FIU L. REV. 111 (2014).
58
See Martins Guerra, supra note 22.
59
CONSTITUIÇÃO DO ESTADO DE RIO DO JANEIRO DE 1989 [STATE CONSTITUTION OF RIO DE
JANEIRO] arts. 32 261; 266; 268 (Braz.).
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that are not related to criminal offenses. In addition to firemen and
policemen, municipal guards are also expected to patrol and conduct
inspections on the vendors at Ipanema Beach, but the municipality employs
a limited number of these public officials across all of Rio de Janeiro’s
forty-six beaches. This scenario of limited enforcement capacity is not far
from the one revealed by research conducted on lobster poaching inspectors
in Canada60 and cattle trespassing control in Shasta County, California.61
Therefore, control of deviants depends primarily on self-help, secondarily
on reports to authorities and, only as a last resource, to formal law
enforcement through the application of fines.62
The prohibition of animals on the Beach and the restriction of
frescobol by the shore provides prodigious examples of the informal
practices of law enforcement. As these legal rules are imposed by
municipal decree, enforcement agents should, strictly speaking, be
municipal guards. However, in the absence of these agents (who are
incapable of monitoring hundreds of thousands of beachgoers over sixty
kilometers of beaches in Rio de Janeiro), individuals take the initiative of
directly complaining to those who take their dogs to the white sands or play
frescobol by the water. If complaints are not sufficient in deterring these
deviants, threatening to report to the authorities may suffice to interrupt the
illegal conduct. If individuals insist on playing frescobol, beachgoers may
request the presence of a public official (not even necessarily a municipal
guard, but lifeguards or military police officers instead) and the rackets and
balls will be confiscated or the deviants will be requested to leave Ipanema
Beach. Fines are not applied for this illegal conduct.
Interestingly, the legal rules invite their own neutralization as a
mechanism of command and control, and they were enacted with an
innovative framework that actually induces this cooperative model of
regulation.63 For instance, the municipal decrees that prohibited pets and
required identification and chains for dogs on the boardwalk expressly
indicate that individuals are expected to complain and ultimately to report
the presence of animals on the beach to municipal guards.64 These local
legal rules also clarify that police officers, firemen or any other public
official will enforce the law, if municipal guards are not found. In addition,
60
John McMullan & David Perrier, Lobster Poaching and the Ironies of Law Enforcement, 36
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 679, 679-718 (2002) [hereinafter McMullan & Perrier].
61
Id. at 679-718.
62
Ellickson, supra note 1, at 625 n.3.
63
McMullan & Perrier, supra note 60, at 679-718.
64
Lei No. 2,358, de 6 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de
08.09.1995; Lei No. 2,574, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 01.10.1997; Lei No. 2,575, de 30 de Setembro de 1997, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE
JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.04.1998 (Braz.).
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these municipal decrees specifically mention that educational campaigns
will be conducted annually to persuade the population of health and safety
issues that justify the prohibition of animals on the beach.65 Finally, these
legal rules do not indicate any specific formal sanction for deviation.66
Therefore, municipal guards are not authorized to fine individuals who
repeatedly bring their dogs to the white sands.
In exceptional
circumstances, however, municipal guards may fine dog owners who fail to
collect animal feces but under another local legal rule that imposes this duty
on pet owners in general.67
The regulatory strategy of the municipality employs informal lines of
action, communication, influence, and control that both enable and routinize
illegal practices.68 As repeat players, dog owners learn through experience
that they will not suffer formal sanctions and they test different places,
times, and authorities to learn how to take their dogs to the white sands of
the beach without being sanctioned. In this case, strict compliance is not
necessary: walking dogs early in the morning or late in the evening averts
this cooperative model of regulation between beachgoers and the
authorities. Likewise, there is a small beach called Praia do Diabo
(“Devil’s Beach”), which is known for its extremely dangerous currents.
This small beach is located at the far north end of Ipanema and has oft been
considered a safe haven for walking dogs because it mainly attracts surfers
who are not bothered by the presence of animals on the sand. In this case,
as informal social norms authorize the presence of dogs in specific times
and places, formal law is translated informally into the very same practices
that it seeks to control.69 On one hand, the legal rule contains a broad
prohibition of animals on beaches.70 On the other hand, dog owners
empirically test this prohibition, seeking social norms that allow what the
formal rules seem to prohibit under particular circumstances. In this sense,
beachgoers are shopping for norms in places like Devil’s Beach.71
Legal rules should no longer claim normative centrality or monopoly
because legal pluralism has eroded positivistic claims to formal legality as
the single normative authority in society.72 Consequently, informal social
65
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Id.
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Id.
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McMullan & Perrier, supra note 60, at 679-718.
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See id.
70
Lei No. 2,358, de 6 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO [D.O.E.R.J.] de
08.09.1995 (Braz.).
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These examples are analogous to cases of accepted deviance presented by Mark Edwards in
his contribution to this symposium. Mark Edwards, Layers of Law and Social Ordering: Of Mirrors,
Bulwarks, and Safety Valves, 10 FIU. L. Rev. 19 (2014).
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John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism? 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986).
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practices are considered essential for effective law enforcement and societal
regulation. Decentering regulation removes the state from the apex of
social control, shifts the relationship between state and society from a
hierarchical to a heterarchical position, and brings complexity into the
regulatory space.73
In practical terms, knowledge and power are
fragmented and reconstructed as a result of the dynamic interaction between
social and governmental actors.74 Decentering regulation also collapses the
distinction between private and public, viewing hybrid organizations or
networks as regulators and taking self-regulation seriously. It addresses
internal regulation through design and implementation of regulation inside
an organization (internalization of rules of conduct by its own members
without external control). It also focuses on external regulation through
practices like contracting (in which the organization and external parties
negotiate contractual terms and become responsible for creating,
monitoring, and enforcing norms).75 Black finds that the attractiveness of
self-regulatory regimes lies in the fact that regulators are also regulated by
culture, are accountable and more democratic, and the distinction between
principal and agent may collapse.76
Particularly on Ipanema Beach, informal networks function as coregulators of socio-legal space. Groups of regular beachgoers develop their
own informal social norms according to their social tribes. For instance,
close to lifeguard tower Number Eight, same-sex couples are free to display
their affection publicly, and kisses between lesbian and gay couples have
been common in this part of Ipanema Beach for decades. In this small safe
haven for the LGBT community, homophobia is strictly prohibited and all
beach vendors exhibit rainbow flags that symbolize gay pride. Close to
lifeguard tower Number Nine, marijuana is freely smoked and any attempt
to repress consumption in this area is faced with stark resistance by the
social network of hippies who inhabit this space. On this part of the Beach,
flags adorned with marijuana leaves and Bob Marley are common.
In contrast, close to lifeguard tower Number Ten, social norms are
embedded in a more elitist normative ethos. This social tribe established
itself very close to the upper class “Rio de Janeiro Country Club” and the
exclusive residential building Cap Ferrat, which is indicative of their more
mainstream perspectives. On this part of the beach, drug consumption and

73
Julia Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and SelfRegulation in a Post-Regulatory World (issue 1), 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103 (2001).
74
Id.; MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE
FRANCE 103-46 (Michel Senellart et al. eds., Graham Burchell trans., Palgrave Macmillan 2009) (197778).
75
Black, supra note 73.
76
Id.
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same-sex love are uncommon practices and would be socially taboo.
Likewise, law enforcement agents would not be criticized for arresting
someone for smoking marijuana in this area. In other words, a complex
array of social norms is generated according to the shared values of these
social networks and these regulate behavior in different spaces of Ipanema
Beach.
In addition to these social tribes, the role of the fixed tent vendors is
also relevant. These individuals manage the space around their tents and
play an important part in the experience of regular beachgoers. They are
expected to provide cold drinks, chairs, and umbrellas for everyone. They
are also responsible for the cleanliness of their share of the beach.
Furthermore, they have to respect consumer protection legislation by
displaying a price list, controlling people’s individual consumption, and
charging prices correctly.77 As small business units, these tents are not
subject to any formal regulatory agency and are simply inspected by
municipal agents who check their compliance with Decree Number 20,225/
01. They are largely self-regulated or co-regulated by social networks. For
instance, especially during summertime, beachgoers press beach vendors
for chairs and sun umbrellas and they rent many more of these than the ten
umbrellas and twenty chairs permitted by legislation. Beach vendors in
Ipanema rent more than the legal limit, due to such a strong business
demand, and they make enough money on any summer day to cover a fine
of seventy-five U.S. Dollars. What’s more, inspections are also often made
during peak periods, when chairs and umbrellas are distributed to customers
on the Beach and municipal guards do not walk around to count how many
umbrellas and chairs bare each vendor’s logo.
Regarding cleanliness, beach vendors are always equipped with a few
large plastic bags to collect garbage, but these are not sufficient for all of
the garbage in the area. Therefore, garbage collection on the sands is a task
performed by multiple actors. Ipanema Beach has a number of “can
collectors,” as picking up beer and soft drink cans and selling them as scrap
for aluminum recycling (fifty cans for one U.S. Dollar) has become an
informal profession in Brazil. Beachgoers dispose them on nearby sands
(but never close to their own personal belongings) and a can collector will
come and pick them up. Many individuals also take care of their own waste
and dispose of it in garbage cans when they leave the Beach. Tent vendors
also collect a part of this waste, but several garbage collectors work daily to
clean the white sands of Ipanema Beach for the following day.
In addition to informal practices of environmental protection, there are
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Decreto No. 20,225/01, de 13 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO
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also social norms regarding consumer protection. Tent vendors are
expected to control food consumption and to charge these expenses when a
client leaves the Beach. However, and particularly during summertime,
trusted regulars may be responsible for the control of their own expenses, as
tent vendors may want to focus on controlling the expenses of non-regulars.
These outsiders should also be aware to ask for prices, especially if they are
foreign tourists. Many beach vendors do not display a list of prices in their
tents (contrary to regulations), and, as they are aware that European and
American currencies are highly valued, they may charge more to these
outsiders than they would charge locals. For these outsiders, asking for the
price is important, and consumer protection becomes a matter of self-help.
On a few occasions, private networks may force price reductions. For
example, if a tourist takes some food, opens the package, and only then asks
for the price, an ambulant vendor may say that this product costs two or
three times the normal price; local beachgoers may protest, tell the tourist
not to pay, and say that they will call the police. In this case, the ambulant
vendor is likely to charge the normal price.
There are also informal dynamics of antitrust law in play at Ipanema
Beach. Beach vendors usually exchange information, and all ambulant and
fixed vendors raise their prices together through consensus. There is thus
little competition, and all products are sold at exactly the same prices across
the sands. Beachgoers may resist these anti-competitive measures by
refusing to buy the vendors’ products and by bringing their own food and
drinks to the Beach. As Ipanema Beach is divided between various social
tribes and multiple networks, typical problems associated with collective
action (i.e., a lack of coordination and communication among beachgoers)
usually prevent these informal antitrust measures. However, at least once,
the collective reaction of consumers was felt by the vendors who reduced
their prices to a former figure in response.78 These informal antitrust
measures also have limited success because bringing food to the Beach is
not fashionable. One of the many cultural distinctions informally
established at Ipanema Beach between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ is
that one group of beachgoers will consume products from the beach
vendors, whereas another group will bring their own food to the Beach.
One of the pejorative terms to refer to ‘have-nots’ is farofeiro, which means
that a person brings a yucca dish to eat at the beach. Therefore, the ‘haves’
are always reluctant to bring their own food to the beach, even when prices
become unfair.79
78
See Gabriel Saboia, Para Fugir dos Precos Elevandos, Carioca Reedita ‘Farofa’ na Areia, O
DIA RIO, (Jan. 20, 2014), available at http://odia.ig.com.br/noticia/rio-de-janeiro/2014-01-20/para-fugirdos-precos-elevados-carioca-reedita-farofa-na-areia.html.
79 As demonstrated by Eden Sarid in his contribution to this symposium, Eden Sarid, Don’t Be a
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In fact, consumer demand has created incentives for segmentation and
the establishment of an informal market of ambulant vendors who sell
unauthorized food on the Beach. According to the municipal decree,
ambulant vendors may only sell mass-produced sandwiches, potato chips,
biscuits, and popsicles.80 However, as there was a strong demand for a
variety of different products, ambulant vendors started to sell Middle
Eastern food, Japanese food, salty pastries, seafood, hot dogs, grilled
cheese, and homemade sandwiches and cakes. Apparently, the initial
rationale for food restriction was the prevention of food poisoning and
intoxication.81 Poor conservation and a lack of hygiene concerns local
authorities; such lax practices may affect the health of beachgoers (who
may eat a toxic shrimp or a contaminated homemade egg salad sandwich).
Nonetheless, consumers seem to ignore these alleged risks and continue to
purchase these unauthorized products; the increasing demand creates great
incentives for additional entries into the food market on Ipanema Beach.
Unlike playing frescobol by the sea and pet owners walking their dogs
on the sand, the variety of food offered by vendors does not bother
beachgoers: no one complains about it or threatens to notify the authorities
of illegal sushi or unauthorized kibbeh on Ipanema Beach. Additionally,
Brazilian newspapers widely publicized the prohibition of dogs and the
restriction of frescobol, but have never reported that only a limited
assortment of food could be sold at the beaches. On the contrary, the local
media has often praised the growing variety of exquisite food available on
Ipanema Beach.82 These unauthorized food suppliers tend to work as
ambulant vendors, who may escape inspection as deftly as a Mexican
bullfighter dodges the horns of his opponent.83 Even if municipal guards
fine the vendors, their profits from food sales easily offset the customary
seventy-five dollar penalty. Moreover, informal social norms at Ipanema
accommodate those in the food market, and the existence of sophisticated

Drag, Just Be a Queen—How Drag Queens Protect their Intellectual Property without Law, 10 FIU L.
REV. 133 (2014), reputation is extremely valuable for social actors—and not only to drag queens. It also
impacts behavior of beachgoers on Ipanema Beach
80 Decreto No. 20,225/01, de 13 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 16.07.2001, art. 6 (Braz.).
81 See Bom Dia Rio, Operação Verão da Vigilância Sanitária Começa Nesta Sexta nas Praias do
Rio, GLOBOTV, (Dec. 6, 2013), http://globotv.globo.com/rede-globo/bom-dia-rio/v/operacao-verao-davigilancia-sanitaria-comeca-nesta-sexta-6-nas-praias-do-rio/3001227/.
82 Louise Peres, Muito Além do Biscoito Globo, VEJARIO, (May 13, 2014 3:04 PM), http://
vejario.abril.com.br/materia/cidade/praia-rio-comida/; Stuart Grudgings, Plano de Ordem Entra em
Choque Com ‘Cultura de Praia’ no Rio, REUTERS, (Dec. 17, 2009, 3:40 PM) http://
www.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,plano-de-ordem-entra-em-choque-com-cultura-de-praia-norio,483739.
83 RODRIGO MENESES, MAPPING A LEGAL CULTURE FROM THE SIDEWALK: LAW AND STREET
VENDORS IN MEXICO CITY (2011).

2014]

Law & (In)formality at Ipanema Beach

201

unauthorized food suppliers contradicts the intuitive impression that
wealthy consumers will reject these products. At least in Ipanema, informal
and formal market players operate together and serve consumers from all
different social tribes. However, as local legislation prohibits the sale of
certain products, tent vendors comply with legal rules and do not risk losing
their work permits to attend to market demand for a broader choice of food
items.
Informal social norms are disseminated through internalization within
the different tribes and networks.84 Individuals learn and internalize
particular social norms as a result of shame and peer pressure against
deviant behavior.85 As a central reference point for social networks of
regular beachgoers, tent vendors may also mediate social relationships in
this area. Though tent vendors should not be perceived as formal lawyers
with expertise in alternative dispute resolution, they may function as
informal mediators on occasion, first talking to the individuals in a personal
conflict, then calling for a peaceful solution to the problem. This role may
also be performed by police officers, lifeguards, municipal guards, and even
other beachgoers. Discussions between partners, friends, and strangers on
the Beach will rarely result in a formal judicial complaint. In fact, disputes,
conflicts, and controversies are rare and, when they do occur, are almost
always solved on the Beach. Only rarely are parties taken to a police
station, as the majority of interpersonal disputes can be solved informally at
the Beach. In the absence of a cheap and easily accessible formal juridical
organ,86 disputes are informally solved by various fragmented and informal
entities that exercise the role of juridical organs on Ipanema Beach.87
Particular disputes may also be solved through persuasion (acceptance due
to identification with authority figures, enthusiasm generated by a group, or
relation to values held in high regard).88
On Ipanema Beach, conflicts are not solved under “the shadow of the
law,”89 as formal law is almost never enforced to solve disputes between
84 See generally Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 157 (2000).
85 Id.
86 A prodigious example of a fast and inexpensive formal juridical organ is Tokyo’s Tuna Court
brilliantly described by Eric Feldman, The Tuna Court: Law and Norms in the World’s Premier Fish
Market, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 332-44 (2006).
87 In contrast to a formal juridical organ like Tokyo’s Tuna Court, the literature offers interesting
examples as well as fragmented and informal entities of dispute resolution, for instance, self-help by
ranchers in Shasta County. See Elickson supra note 1, at 676-85. For more on Resident’s Associations
at Brazilian favelas, see Sousa Santos, supra note 3, at 38-89.
88 Id.
89 In this sense, Ipanema Beach resembles Shasta County, where formal law does not strongly
influence informal dispute resolution mechanisms. See Ellickson, supra note 1, at 623 n.3; see also id.
at 667-71.
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beachgoers. Conflicts are normally solved under the shadow of a sun
umbrella or a beach tent, since other beachgoers, or a vendor, may function
as persuader or mediator. Likewise, even public authorities try to solve
conflicts through informal conversation before proceeding to the police
station, producing the official paperwork, and eventually arresting an
offender. Only for more serious criminal offences (e.g., robbery, theft, or
assault) would the police abandon their patrolling duties on the sands, while
minor offences (e.g., verbal assault, disorderly conduct, or harassment)
would not be registered. The police take notice of minor offenses, but these
offenders are not officially charged. As the police have to optimize limited
resources and control large crowds, the criminal code during summer days
is, in practice, reduced to the more serious crimes and petit crimes are not
regularly repressed. Ultimately, none of the Beach’s legal actors are keen
on leaving Ipanema Beach before due time. This may be the worst sanction
for everyone: trade a day on the Beach for a day of bureaucratic procedures
at a police station. This reflects the general consensus that formal law
should only be applied as a last resort. As suggested by Sousa Santos, law
resembles a chameleon.90 Sometimes, formal legal rules are enforced as
such, but sometimes their colors change and informal social norms
metamorphose the law into a new form.91
Mapping the law in action at Ipanema, we observe the differences of
scale, projection, and symbolization explained in Sousa Santos´ legal
cartography.92 Regarding scale, the Union owns all beaches, but may not
operate at the local level, where we find large-scale law. The state and the
municipality operate at the local level, but without investing sufficient
institutional and symbolic resources. Therefore, informal social norms
develop through social tribes. Further, social networks interact with the
formal legal rules in play at the Beach, and this socio-legal space is shaped
by values held by the middle and upper classes. In terms of symbolization,
the idea that Brazilian beaches are democratic spaces is mythical, as there is
not equal participation and symmetrical power for all beachgoers at
Ipanema Beach. All beachgoers are distinguished by particular cultural
traits, socio-economic backgrounds, and membership to tribes and
networks.93
In this sense, the stark differentiation between asphalt and the favelas

90 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading Toward a Postmodern Conception of
Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 299 n.3 (1987) [hereinafter Sousa Santos, Map of Misreading].
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF
TASTE (Routledge Classics 2013) (1984).
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that socially divides Rio de Janeiro is also present at the Beach.94 Social
hierarchies are reproduced, and social interaction between the ‘haves’ and
“have-nots” is low. Ipanema Beach is neither horizontal nor heterarchical.95
Beachgoers share the same geographical area, but their Beach experience is
socially different. This relates to an obvious concern regarding the
protection of private property on the sands. Because there are not enough
law enforcement agents, individuals cooperate within their social networks
to secure their private property. For instance, whenever a group of friends
go to the sea, they ask their neighbors to watch their belongings to prevent
theft. Tourists are outsiders; therefore they are usually unaware of these
informal social arrangements and may also be unaware of the socioeconomic division between “haves” and “have-nots” at Ipanema, making
their property more vulnerable.
V. LAND OCCUPATION AND LEGAL CULTURE: INACCESSIBLE BEACHES,
PRIVATE GAIN, AND CONQUERING SPACE THROUGH RITUAL
Law usually regulates land occupation, classifies private and public
property, defines different modes of land acquisition, and disciplines quasiproperty regimes, such as possession and collateral rights that are not
equivalent to property. In the case of Ipanema Beach, the Federal
Constitution simply defines beaches as property of the Union,96 and the
State Constitution of Rio de Janeiro guarantees the fundamental right of
access to beaches as well as the removal of private edifications from the
sands;97 formal legal rules neither discipline land occupation nor establish
how citizens should enjoy their fundamental right of access to the beaches;
rather, informal social norms define how land is occupied at Ipanema
Beach.
Surprisingly, and in contrast to the Brazilian idea that beaches are
democratic spaces, there are two small beaches between Ipanema and
Copacabana that are closed to the public. Even though the State
Constitution of Rio de Janeiro guarantees access to beaches,98 these two
particular beaches are inaccessible. Since they are located within a military
fortress, beachgoers are not allowed to enter the area. These two small
beaches are right next to the Devil’s Beach, and soldiers remain vigilant in
order to prevent surfers, and beachgoers in general, from reaching these
94

Sousa Santos, supra note 3, at 126.
LAURENCE FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY 1-15 (1999).
96 See CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL DE 1988 [FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
OF BRAZIL] art. 20, IV (Braz.), DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 5.10.1988.
97 CONSTITUIÇÃO DO ESTADO DE RIO DO JANEIRO DE 1989 [STATE CONSTITUTION OF RIO DE
JANEIRO] art. 32, II (Braz.).
98 Id.
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prohibited sands. Interestingly, these two beaches are occasionally rented
out by the fortress administration for private events, such as weddings and
parties. In fact, in 2013, the Aquello Beach Club, which is presented as a
case study below in section VII, used them to host an event. Moreover,
family members of the military have access to the area and may reserve
these beaches for barbecues or other social gatherings. Therefore, there is a
clear gap between the law in the books and the law in action, as access to
these in-fortress beaches is very limited.
On the other hand, public spaces are explored in economic terms with
a view for financial return to very few. First, parking close to Ipanema
Beach is very limited, and some individuals have decided to exploit this
scarce resource. These individuals locate themselves close to public
parking places, orient drivers toward empty ones, and guide the car so it is
accommodated in a parking bay. However, they expect to be paid for this
work and for taking care of the automobile. In contrast to most European
and American cities in which drivers find empty places and pay for this
service through a parking meter, taking care of cars in the street has become
an informal profession in many parts of Brazil. In some circumstances,
drivers are indirectly threatened when they refuse to pay these car watchers
and warned that Ipanema is a dangerous neighborhood in which the vehicle
is vulnerable to theft or vandalism without proper vigilance. Drivers,
therefore, tend to give in money to these informal car watchers in order to
avoid being victimized.
Second, tent vendors also exploit the Beach, as they are licensed to
rent chairs and sun umbrellas. In this way, they organize land use around
their tents by diffusing beachgoers in the areas where they locate their
chairs and umbrellas. As they do not have exclusive rights over the area,
anyone may bring his or her own chairs and umbrellas. Land use, by
beachgoers, is defined by prior self-establishment, and newcomers will
respect those who have already established themselves in a given area.
Rules of etiquette suggest that some space should be left for the free
movement of beachgoers, especially in areas with access to the sea and
tents. During summer however, different groups of people are usually
situated very close to each other and walking around the beach becomes
more difficult.
Sport schools also have an area reserved for the practice of volleyball,
soccer, or footvolley. Likewise, companies may temporarily rent beach
areas and designate them for specific activities. For instance, the Bank of
Brazil regularly sponsors beach volleyball or soccer tournaments, during
which large areas on the sands are closed off for purposes of creating of a
provisory arena. Likewise, there are sometimes concerts or religious
ceremonies on the Beach, during which certain areas are reserved for music
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producers or churches. Furthermore, areas may be temporarily closed for
private parties (particularly on summer evenings, New Year’s Eve being a
favorite). In any event, simply saying that the Beach is a public area
obscures the fact that it is privately used and exploited by different
economic agents.
One interesting fact regarding the occupation of space on Rio de
Janeiro’s beaches relates to the use of the beach wrap, popularly known as
canga. In addition to being used as a cover up for women on their way to
the Beach, the beach wrap is also used to define land use. As this artifact is
essentially feminine, there are subtle games between men and women
regarding being welcome on someone’s beach wrap. As this wrap
demarcates a woman’s intimate territory, access is limited to friends and
significant others, like boyfriends or girlfriends, life partners or sex buddies,
and also those finding their way into the particular universe of personal
affection. A single man could, in theory, buy his own beach wrap, take it to
the Beach, and lay down on it, but he would be perceived as an outsider, or
as eccentric. Tourists are often seen lying on hotel towels, which clearly
indicates their outsider status. Local men often sit on beach chairs and
negotiate access to the beach wraps of the women whom they are interested
in becoming more intimate with. Though these beach wraps are not
Aladdin’s flying carpet, they involve personal rituals to conquer space,
recognition of personal affection, and have their own anthropological
magic. In other words, they represent more than just a piece of cloth on the
white sands of Ipanema Beach and have a symbolic value that may not
easily be observed without an anthropological perspective.
VI. LAW AND ORDER AND RESISTANCE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND
BROKEN WINDOWS
Most of the analytical narratives above refer to the socio-legal norms
on Ipanema Beach that ran until approximately 2008. In 2009, a newly
elected mayor promised to establish public order in the entire city. As part
of his political agenda, a Secretariat for Public Order was established,
whose mission involves the effective enforcement of legal rules and the
elimination of informal social norms.99 For instance, informal car watchers
were substituted with formal licensed workers, who now charge a fixed
price and are more respectful to drivers. Tent vendors are now inspected by
municipal guards more frequently and are more careful to comply with
legal rules. Before these inspections, many tent vendors would not wear
their official uniform to work. As this is now a legal requirement, tent
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vendors usually wear their uniforms to work. Likewise, establishing public
order involved enforcing local laws that prohibit a wide variety of food
choices for beachgoers. Since 2009, sushi, seafood, and grilled cheese
appear less frequently on Ipanema Beach. Furthermore, the presence of
animals has been strictly prohibited. Municipal guards enforce the
prohibitive law even at the Devil’s Beach, where beachgoers tolerate dogs
walking on the sand. Until 2008, there were some twenty municipal guards
responsible for inspections in Rio de Janeiro. Since 2009, at least 200
public officials have been mobilized to support the operations of the
Secretariat of Public Order on the beaches during summer.
All these measures that strictly enforce legal rules were received with
skepticism from the media and were met with resistance from disciplined
individuals.100 For instance, informal car watchers still try to work on
streets that are not covered by formal workers. Tent vendors insist on
renting more umbrellas and chairs than allowed by their permits.
Unauthorized ambulant vendors still commercialize prohibited food, even
though the risks of being caught and eventually sanctioned are higher.
Newspapers finally publicized the governmental decision that only massproduced food should be consumed on the beaches and suggested that even
coconut water could be banned by the municipal administration. As a
consequence of these public critiques, the mayor announced that there were
no plans to ban coconuts from Rio’s beaches and also established a decree
in which ambulant vendors of iced tea, lemonade, and starchy biscuits were
considered to be part of the cultural heritage of Rio de Janeiro.101
Furthermore, a recent law has determined that the city must annually
produce educational campaigns regarding prohibited food on the beach, and
kiosks and tents should also display this information to consumers. Dog
owners organized an invasion of Devil’s Beach on September 11, 2011, and
simultaneously took dozens of pets on the sands to protest against strict
enforcement of legislation by the secretary of public order. All these
episodes are interesting examples of resistance to law enforcement through
informal social practices.
The most prodigious example of resistance to the application of legal
rules on the Beach was observed at the hippie’s social tribe, close to
lifeguard tower Number Nine. In 1995, the State Secretary of Public Safety
began to arrest marijuana smokers on the Beach; he wanted to eliminate the
free smoking zone designation near lifeguard tower Number Nine. As a
100 In analogous cases, Lawrence Friedman highlights the clash between high law and low law in
his contribution to this symposium. Lawrence M. Friedman, High and Low Law, 10 FIU L. REV. 53
(2014). In my account, however, socio-legal normative orders emerge within complex networks.
101 Decreto No. 35,179, de 2 de Março de 2012, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO RIO DE JANEIRO
[D.O.E.R.J.] de 05.03.2012 (Braz.).
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consequence of the constant police operations and the imprisonment of
hippie beachgoers, members of this tribe decided to establish a cooperative
arrangement to prevent future imprisonment of marijuana smokers. A
group of self-proclaimed anarchists distributed 1,500 plastic whistles and
this social tribe took it upon themselves to make lots of noise to warn
potential marijuana smokers of the presence of police officers in their area.
This created sufficient time for smokers to throw away their marijuana
cigarettes and to hide their marijuana in safe places. This example
demonstrates the importance of networks within different social tribes, and
how this particular tribe enacted an informal social norm of collective
cooperation as a guarantee for the social norm that originally established the
area as a free zone for marijuana consumption. In more recent years, a
permanent military police tent has been established right next to the
lifeguard tower Number Nine. As a consequence, the entire tribe decided to
move a couple of hundred meters south and the community of hippies is
now located at Nine and a half, instead of directly at point Number Nine, as
before.
Recent initiatives for stricter law enforcement are related to
consumer protection. Inspectors are demanding that all vendors display a
list with products and their prices. In addition, public officials from the
Municipal Department of Consumer Protection will join municipal guards
in their inspections on the Beach. The mayor recently established this
special consumer protection program through a decree.102 In addition,
despite a few episodes of resistance to formal law enforcement, polls
indicate that eighty percent of the population approves the movement of law
and order on the beaches.103 Therefore, the Secretariat for Public Order
coordinates the annual program “Shock of Order” on the beaches during
summer. Since 2009, Ipanema Beach has been a preferential target for this
program and several inspections have taken place.
VII. A DEMOCRATIC BEACH?
This range of disciplinary measures invites the academic assessment of
the widespread idea that Brazilian beaches are democratic spaces. In
Foucauldian terms, power is exercised by public authorities not only to
impose discipline, but also to regulate the behavior of the masses.104 As a
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disciplinary power, inspectors impose a pattern of normality and punish
abnormal behavior through fines, suspensions, and other modes of
punishment. Since 2009, there has been regular surveillance and discipline
of beach vendors. In this sense, Ipanema Beach has become a venue where
Foucauldian power micro-physics operates and a form of political optics is
clearly in action.
Interestingly, Ipanema Beach provides a prodigious example of
fragmented power being widely used by various non-state actors. Power is
exercised by beach goers, beach vendors, lifeguards, municipal guards,
police officers, and car watchers. In sum, everyone involved in this space
imparts its power dynamics through way of their decisions and behavior,
which shape the political landscape of Ipanema Beach. In this sense,
deepening Foucauldian power micro-physics, we may conceive multiple
power vectors in various directions of conduct and counter-conduct. The
sum of these political vectors differs according to the area, tribe, and
network we study. For instance, around lifeguard tower Number Eight
multiple small acts of LGBT pride protect the public display of same-sex
affection there. Likewise, around lifeguard tower Number Nine multiple
small acts of cooperation between marijuana smokers protect its free
consumption and resistance to imprisonment.
On the other hand,
microphysics of power around lifeguard tower Number Ten are mainstream
and operate according to the status quo, so the sum of political vectors is
very different here from competing areas. As a result, near tower Number
Ten, moral or legal repression of a same-sex kiss or a drug arrest will not be
resisted by the fragmented power of individual actors.
In addition to disciplinary power, there are many bio-power dynamics
on Ipanema Beach.105 Foucault referred to this type of power as
“governmentality” and characterized it as demographical control of large
groups of the population106 Instead of punishing, bio-power focuses on the
regulatory control of behavior.107 In this sense, the stark distinction
between the law on asphalt and the law of Pasargada traced by Sousa
Santos makes a huge difference to the socio-legal experience of “haves”
and “have-nots.” Unsurprisingly, anthropologist Julia O’Donnell identifies
the social invention of the Copacabana Beach as a process of symbolic
reconstruction of the sands, as a space destined for fashionable local
elites.108 As a consequence, the urban poor were regulated and controlled

POPULATION (2009) [hereinafter SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION].
105 See generally SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION, supra note 104.
106 See id.
107 See id.
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not only by public authorities, but also by members of the local elite who
would reprimand their behavior, through shaming and blaming dynamics, to
exclude them from their social networks.109
A careful local observer knows that there is a stark contrast between
the “haves” and the “have-nots” on the beaches in terms of their social
contacts, their consumption patterns, and their perception of other groups of
people. In this case, it seems that all three social tribes previously identified
are somehow similar in the sense that “have-nots” are excluded from the
middle and upper class networks. Likewise, members of the local elite
imagine that they have an entitlement over their beach experience and that
both the space and its symbolic significance should be shaped by their own
fragmented power and informal social norms. In this sense, the elite’s
discursive practices usually blame the urban poor for the ruin of their beach
experience.
Along with this, there is the mystique of democratic beaches and an
exotic association of these geographical areas with a form of government.
However, it seems difficult to accept the idea that there is equal
participation and symmetrical power for all beachgoers in Brazil. On the
contrary, the elites are more powerful in terms of hegemonic cultural
dominance.110 Therefore, Brazilian media reproduces the upper class
discourse of deterioration of the Beach experience due to the growing,
unregulated, undisciplined presence of the urban poor. These dynamics
may be characterized as bio-politics,111 because the different networks
function as a social panopticon that surveys and regulates the urban poor on
Ipanema Beach. These regulations are done through symbolic power
dynamics, who are expected to change their conduct from abnormal to
normal. As Foucault associated knowledge and power as fused social
forces of behavioral control and restated Kelsen’s theory of law as a system
of normality instead of a system of norms, this notion of bio-politics
facilitates our comprehension of Ipanema Beach as a socio-legal space in
which the elite uses its power to regulate the urban poor.112
However, it should be noted that ‘the masses’ could very well gain
control over the space. After the inauguration of a subway stop in Ipanema
in 2009, the yuppie social tribe did not accept the invasion of lifeguard
tower Number Ten by masses of urban poor, and the entire social tribe
migrated to lifeguard tower Number Twelve, in the nearby beach of Leblon
(two kilometers south of the previous location). Therefore, Ipanema Beach
JANEIRO] (Zahar 2013).
109
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is falsely characterized as a special democratic place in which all
individuals have equal participation and symmetrical power. This sociolegal space is in fact segmented into different tribes, networks, and classes;
and its vertical hierarchies lead us to conclude that Ipanema Beach is not
horizontally formed.113 As O’Donnell puts it, this notion of a democratic
beach is just a myth.114
On the other hand, the upper echelons of society enjoy this rhetoric of
a democratic beach. An interesting case study comes from the inauguration
of a beach club inside the Fortress of Copacabana called Aqueloo and
intended for the upper classes. As the investors rented the space from the
military for $150,000, invested $1,500,000 in its internal infrastructure, and
sold tickets for $125.00 to men and $30.00 to women.115 These high
investments meant that Aqueloo would have to charge expensive tickets
and select its clientele based on purchase power in stark contrast with social
dynamics at Ipanema Beach. This Beach Club had a dance floor with
electronic music, a bar, a restaurant, a beauty parlor, a spa, a store, and
eighteen different VIP areas that could be rented out on a daily basis (the
cheapest ones for $2,000 and the most expensive one for $10,000).116 In
terms of commercialized products, clients consumed approximately one
hundred bottles of the French champagne Veuve Clicquot a day at $180 per
bottle.117 There were a variety of other luxurious food and drink items on
the menu, from oysters and seafood to Scotch whisky and Russian vodka.118
Even though this club was located on a beach, many of the 500 guests
would spend most of their time on the dance floor and internal areas, as
opposed to the sands and the sea. Many of the women would not even be
dressed in the typical beachwear of a bikini and flip-flops, but rather in
shorts, shirts, and high heels. In its two months of operation since
inauguration on January 7, 2013, the entrepreneurs recovered their
investment and one hundred employees benefitted from temporary jobs at
this beach club, which was originally supposed to function until March 2,
2013.119
However, the magazine Veja produced a news report entitled “The
Beach of the Rich” on February 27, 2013 that described Aqueloo as an
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exclusive place for the wealthiest in Rio.120 Among the interviewees, the
manager stated that clients could bring their Rolex watches and their Louis
Vuitton purses without fear of theft, as there were twenty-five security
guards on duty at all times.121 Sociologist Camila Diniz declared that she
abandoned Ipanema Beach for the club because of the selected clientele and
the fact that she could drink champagne and have a hairbrush with
professionals better than those one would find in France.122 Dominic
Ahnee, a tourist from Hawaii, praised the beauty of women there, while
Michelle Shane echoed this idea, saying that there were only beautiful
people there and that men knew how to approach women.123 Finally, the
main investor declared that the area was originally used only by the military
for private functions with their families and that the area was then opened
up to their clients.124 The entrepreneurs had been so successful that they
were planning to establish a membership card for frequent guests. This
report sparked controversy on the Internet. An invasion was quickly
organized via Facebook for the following Sunday, March 2, (scheduled to
take place just three days after the news report was published) and 1,250
people confirmed their attendance to this event within twenty-four hours.125
They were planning to gather together at 10:00 in the morning and invade
the military area on Aqueloo’s last day.126 As a consequence of this threat,
the military decided that the club would not function on Sunday, so
Saturday, March 1, would be Aqueloo’s final day in 2013.127
Protesters celebrated their victory by claiming that they had restored
beach democracy in Rio de Janeiro.128 Aqueloo defenders argued that the
Beach Club was open to everyone who could afford to buy tickets, but now
no one would be able to reach the fortress’ beach anymore.129 In addition,
the Beach Club provided jobs and a new tourist attraction for the city.130
They attributed the controversy to envy and lamented the premature closing
120
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of Aqueloo.131 Residents from neighboring buildings celebrated the
decision, as they had complained against the loud electronic music that ran
between 10:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.132 They had filed petitions to the
Attorney General’s Office to investigate the legality of this Beach Club
inside the fortress of Copacabana.133 This interesting case study highlights
the false consciousness that beaches are democratic spaces in Brazil. In
truth, Brazilians share the same geographical space and there is no apartheid
on Ipanema Beach, but tribes, networks, and classes establish their own
mechanisms for inclusion and exclusion, and the logic of informal group
membership reigns. Likewise, everyone has free access to the beaches, but
the space is privately exploited and occupied by all sorts of different socioeconomic actors. Furthermore, bio-politics and disciplinary power establish
imaginary hierarchies on Ipanema Beach, which results in a lack of equal
participation or symmetrical power for beachgoers to shape its socio-legal
space. The ‘democratic beach’ is clearly a myth. In reality, Ipanema Beach
is segmented by tribes, networks, and classes, which produce informal
social norms that shape the socio-legal space and reproduce societal
distinctions on its sands.
VIII. FINAL REMARKS
This article explored the interplay of formal and informal normative
arrangements and provided an ethnographical analysis of socio-legal norms
at Ipanema Beach. For Brazilian society, beaches are so important that
even constitutional norms regulate their operation and guarantee free access
for everyone. This article discussed the existence of an informal food
market at Ipanema Beach and analyzed its regulation, informal
arrangements of antitrust (anticompetitive market prices), as well as issues
of environmental and consumer protection. In addition, this study assessed
informal land regimes and discussed which norms are available to regulate
the occupation of the space by beachgoers, including exploitation for
private gain. In this context, tent managers and informal parking space
finders provide informal arrangements that guarantee parking, tents, and
chairs for beachgoers. The state is also present at Ipanema Beach by way of
municipal guards, police officers, and lifeguards, who are expected to
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enforce law and order. This study showed that regulation of space on
Ipanema Beach is decentered, fragmented, and operates beyond the
boundaries of traditional public-private divide.
Furthermore, examples of resistance to legal regulations and to
criminal law enforcement were analyzed. For instance, marijuana smokers
tend to frequent a particular area of the Beach, and make noise to alert
others of police officers in an effort to prevent arrests. Further, frescobol
players are not fined for playing the game at certain times, but at nondesignated times their sanctions consist of warnings, threats of being
reported to authorities, and eventually the confiscation of the ball. Dogs are
generally prohibited, though they are tolerated in an isolated corner of the
Beach. In summary, a range of (in)formal normative arrangements
characterize law and society at Ipanema Beach. Finally, Brazilians usually
refer to beaches as “democratic spaces” and this paper investigated the
exotic association between a geographical area and governmental structure,
concluding that equal participation and symmetrical power for all
beachgoers in Brazil is not realistic. This notion of a democratic beach is
just a myth, as Ipanema Beach is segmented by tribes, networks, and
classes, which produce informal social norms that shape the socio-legal
space and reproduce societal distinctions on its sands.
In terms of contribution to the socio-legal literature, this article
demonstrates the relevance of multiple networks for formation and
implementation of socio-legal normative orders beyond close ethnic groups
and close-knit communities.134 In this complex scenario, this study shows
that multiple private and public actors are norm-makers, because their
individual and collective moves generate reactions of acceptance,
resistance, and accommodation within this socio-legal space. For instance,
acceptance of dogs and frescobol on Devil’s Beach established this area as a
safe haven for pet owners and racket players. In addition, resistance against
homophobia, war on drugs, and abusive pricing generated informal
practices of same-sex protection, marijuana decriminalization and antitrust.
Moreover, conflicts are accommodated under the shadow of umbrellas and
the ultimate solution is often different from the law in the books. Adopted
in the absence or against the state, these normative practices emerge within
complex networks, because not only the Union, the State, and the City of
Rio de Janeiro, but also tribes, clubs, and classes establish normative order
at Ipanema Beach.
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